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It is easy to become federal tax conscious to the point of showing a
phlegmatic concern for state taxes. On a revenue basis, however, state
taxes still account for a sizable portion of the total collections. Thus, the
national total of state tax receipts for the fiscal year 1953 amounted to
$10.5 billion. This represented a $700 million increase over the previous
year,' and about twice the receipts of a decade ago.2 These amounts, of
course, represent national totals; and collectively, they emphasize the
growing practical importance of taxation at the state level.
As far as Florida itself is concerned, both the courts and the legislature
have shown a lively interest in the state's tax matters. In many situations,
new jurisprudence has been created both by the judiciary and the legislature.
For example, Florida's popular homestead exemption has been the target
of such joint consideration.
In order to present a balanced portrayal of these developments, the
suceeding sections have been divided into the two basic sources of tax
jurisprudence: judicial and legislative developments.
JUDICIAL DEvELOPMENTS
Homestead exemption.-Some interesting questions were presented in
the application of the Florida homestead exemption provisions?
Thus, in Overstreet v. Tubin,4 it was held that a duplex was entitled
only to the single $5,000 exemption-in spite of the fact that the structure
was jointly owned by two separate parties. It had been the contention of
the taxpayer that each of the occupants was entitled to the full $5,000.
This theory was rejected by the court. It was held immaterial that each
unit of the building was separately owned in fee simple by its occupant;
and that each unit contained distinct plumbing, wiring, entrances, and
walkways. Likewise, by the applicable zoning ordinance, only a two-family
dwelling was permitted; but this prerequisite was likewise regarded as
unimportant insofar as the exemption itself was concerned.
*Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law.
1. 96 J. ACCOUNTANCY 587 (1953).
2. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, 5 (1952).
3. See FLA. GONST. Art. X, § 7; FLA. STAT. § 192.12 (1951).
4. 53 So.2d 913 (Fla. 1951).
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The case,' however, did announce that the individual owners could
split the $5,000 allowance among themselves. It would appear that this
decision operates against those who, for reasons of either preference or
economic necessity, seek a duplex living arrangement-if such persons
qualify for the homestead exemption. It would likewise appear that the
decision might seriously inhibit this form of architecture in Florida. Here,
as elsewhere, one may find technology shaping itself to the practicalities
of law. Still, ill full fairness to the situation, the decision is in accord
with earlier cases.' For this reason, it appears on sound judicial grounds-
irrespective of its inhibition of duplex development in the state.
Where a homestead claimant challenged the validity of a statute
7
requiring one year's residence before one would be permitted to apply for
an exemption,8 the court in its opinion, sustained the claimant's contention;
and accordingly, the statute was declared unconstitutional.9  Thus, the
Constitution provides that, "The Legislature may prescribe appropriate and
reasonable laws regulating the manner of establishing the right to said
exemption."' 0  Nevertheless, it was held that such a discretionary grant
did not include the prerogative to specify an antecedent residence period.
In this decision, the court accordingly applied a broad construction to the
Constitutional exemption grant, as it had also done on previous occasions.1'
The liberal construction extended in that situation should be contrasted
with the narrow administrative application applied in the Overstreet Case.'
2
"The immunity from forced sale for the debts of the family which the
homestead enjoyed during the decedent's lifetime continues to exist for
the benefit of the widow and lineal decedents."' 8 In rendering the decision,
the court also held that the exemption applied to a total of forty acres,
which consisted of a five-acre tract (on which the major portion of the
house was located) held as an estate by entirety, and an adjoining thirty-five
acres held by the husband in his own name."4 Here, in this probate situation,
the claimant was brought within the purview of the exemption.
These cases above are illustrative of the interesting situations that
continue to arise because of the homestead exemption dispensation.
Exemptions have an affinity for both unique situations and litigation in
any tax statute, so that these developments in the Florida law should not
represent a surprise.
5. Ibid.
6. For example, the court stated that exemptions were to be construed against
the claimant, Steuart v. State, 119 Fla. 117, 161 So. 378 (1935). See also Smith
v. Guckenheirner, 42 Fla. 1, 27 So. 900 (1900) for an early viewpoint of this matter.
7. FLA. STAT. § 191.12(1) (1951).
8. Sparkman v. State, 58 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1952).
9. FLA. CONST. Art. X, § 7.
10. Ibid.
11. Jacksonville v. Bailey, 159 Fla. 11, 30 So.2d 529 (1947); Smith v. Voight,
158 Fla. 366, 28 So.2d 426 (1946).
12. 53 So.2d 913 (Fla. 1951).
13. Wilson v. Florida Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 64 So.2d 309, 313 (Fla. 1953).
14. Ibid.
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Other exemptions.-An interesting question was presented when
Charlotte County attempted to collect taxes for state lands situated within
the county borders.15 The specific land was held by the Game and Fresh
Water Fish Commissign in the name of the State of Florida, and the
county accordingly sought to levy a debt service and general county operating
tax on these properties. The court held that the land was entitled to an
exemption. 1 It would appear, in this connection, that the effect of the
case is to preserve carefully the sovereignty and immunity of the state-
even against encroachments by a county government. 17  Where the
legislature had granted an exemption from "state, county, municipal, and
all other ad valorem taxes on real and personal property owned, controlled
or used by the county of Escambia or the Santa Rosa Island Authority,"'8,
it was contended that this provision violated the Florida Constitutional
provision' 0 prohibiting non-uniformity of taxes.20 In refusing to sustain
this contention, the court said that the legislature had the prerogative of
classifying property as a "county purpose"; and hence, the power to grant
an exemption because of such a public purpose. 21 However, the court
still reserved its right of judicial review to such classifications. 2 2 The
classificatory review right, of course, is a traditional constitutional feature.
23
A question of both local and national importance was presented to the
Florida Supreme Court.24 The plaintiff corporation had leased land from
the United States Government (for $100 a year for 75 years) for the
purpose of constructing about 450 family dwelling units for military
personnel. The plaintiff contended, on this basis, that it was exempt
from taxes levied on materials used in the construction of this project.
The court rejected this contention, noting that the federal laws themselves
15. State v. Webb, 49 So.2d 93 (Fla. 1950).
16. The basis of this conclusion was founded on a decision that FLA. STAT. §§ 192.06
and 192.08 (1951) were controlling; that they prevailed over §§ 372.12 and 372.18
enacted at an earlier date.
17. In an interesting dissenting opinion written by Justice Roberts, a concern
is expressed for a surrender of taxing power. The opinion, in part, states:
We do not think, however, that because the Legislature and the people
determined to divest themselves in this instance of their power to control
game and fish in this state it necessarily follows that they intended, at the
same time, to divest themselves of their sovereign power of taxation.
Justice Adams concurred in the dissent. It would appear that the dissent raises
the interesting question of limiting a state's power to encroach on the taxing
prerogatives of the county, even though the latter is a creature of the former.
18. State v. Escambia County, 52 So.2d 125, 130 (Fla. 1951); see also Spec.
Laws 1949, c. 25810.
19. Art. IX, § 1.
20. State v. Escambia County, 52 So.2d 125 (Fla. 1951).
21. FLA. CONST. Art. IX, § I (provides that the legislature may grant exemptions
to property used for "municipal, education, literary, scientific, religious, or charitable
pturposes" "
22. See note 18 sujra.
23. See City of Lakeland v. Amos, 106 Fla. 873, 143 So. 744 (1932); cf. Harper
v. McDavid, 45 Fla. 605, 200 So. 100 (1941).
24. Gay v. Jemison, 52 So.2d 137 (Fla, 1951).
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do not necessarily prohibit the collection of sales taxes simply because
a transaction occurs on a United States' reservation.25 Also, although bare
title to the property remained with the U. S. Government, its effective
enjoyment and pecuniary profit vested in the plaintiff corporation. The
Supreme Court said:
It is true that the government, through its military, retains a
certain supervision over the area where the project is located and
has a preference with reference to accommodations for its personnel,
but taken as a whole, the arrangement is in reality one affording
a source of income to the lessee, and we think it is obvious that
any money withheld from the state by applying the exemption would
not benefit the national exchequer but would reach the pockets
of private citizens. The corporation borrows the money, takes
the risks, bears the cost of maintenance and insurance, rcccives
the income from rentals, and in case of total destruction of a
building by fire, keeps if it chooses, the money paid by the insurance
company to cover the loss. The corporation must pay the debt
it incurs to finance the installation, and certainly any profit for
a period of seventy-five years belongs to it. Meanwhile, as a part
of its expenses, there is a nominal payment of $100 a year to the
government as lessor.
We believe the comptroller's position is correct and that the
materials furnished by the contractor will not become a part of a
government work but of buildings of a private enterprise and
therefore are subject to state tax.20
The opinion of the court appears clearly within an established concept
of examining the substance and managerial effect of tax transactions,
rather than being completely bound by legal mechanics. A similar view
was expressed rather recently by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky27 when
it refused a tax exemption for property owned in fee by a seminary, where
the seminary had leased such property on a 99 year lease, and a bus depot
and garage was erected thereon. In reaching its conclusion denying the
tax exemption, the Kentucky court said:
It can readily be foreseen that tax exempt organizations might
be extensively used by commercial organizations to evade payment
of taxes on real estate improvements through the medium of long
term leases, if we should deny the right of a taxing authority to
make separate assessments of buildings and of lands in cases of
this kind.28
It would appear, at least, that both Florida and Kentucky have
followed the same school of thought in denying exemptions on these
long-term leasing arrangements.
A hospital does not lose its charitable character (and hence, its
25. 61 STAT. 641 (1947); 4 U.S.C. § 105 (Supp. V).
26. Gay v. Jemison, 52 So.2d 137, 138 (Fla. 1951).
27. Broadway and Fourth Avenue Realty Co. v. Louisville, 303 Ky. 202, 197 S.W.2d
238 (19461.
28. Id. at 240.
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exemption privilege) 29 simply because patients able to pay were required
to pay in order to finance facilities for charitable cases.30 As long as the
ultimte effect was to operate on a non-profit basis, a tax exemption was
justified."' The view of the court is easily understood. Its viewpoint
represents a practical realization that hospitals must receive revenues
from some patients in order to meet basic administrative costs; that
professional responsibility demands that there be a rendition of charitable
services; and, a fortiori, those patients able to pay can properly be
expected to do so while charitable cases are naturally treated without cost.
The importance of non-profitability of the organization's entire activities,
of course, was recognized in the court's opinion.
Venue.-The question of venue arose in a case litigated before the
Florida Supreme Court.32 The court reaffirmed its rule:
. . . when the legislature has fixed the residence of a government
agency . . . , a suit primarily affecting the construction of the
rules or regulations of the agency must be brought in the county
of its headquarters if the defendant claims that privilege, while
suits for protection against constitutional rights of the plaintiff
within the county where the suit is instituted, the validity of
such rules being only secondary, may be entertained in the county
where the invasion is threatened or has occurred.83
The opinion recapitulated earlier views of the court under varying
circumstances where the question of "venue" compared with "jurisdiction"
bad arisen.8 4
Documentary stamps.-This tax also experienced judicial constructions.
On one occasion, 5 the court recited that the Florida statute36 was similar
to the federal enactment;7 therefore the Florida statute would be given
the same construction in the state courts as the federal statute was given
in federal courts.38 In another case,30 the court held that the documentary
stamp tax applied only to transfers made in exchange of a monetary
consideration. The court noted again that it was not departing from
the federal viewpoint. 40
29. FLA. CONST. Art. IX. § I (authorizes exemptions from charitable organizations).
30. Orange County v. Orlando Osteopathic Hospital, 66 So.2d 285 (Fla. 1953).
31. The court also noted that the hospital had been exempt from Federal income
taxes since its incorporation.
32. Henderson v. Gay, 49 So.2d 325 (Fla. 1950).
33. Id. at 326.
'34. Caulden v. Gay, 47 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1950); See Gay v. Ogilvie, 47 So.2d 525
(Fla. 1950); Smith v. Williams, 160 Fla. 580, 35 So.2d 844 (Fla. 1948).
35. Gay v. Inter-County Tel. & Tel. Co., 60 So.2d 22 (Fla. 1952).
36. FLA. STAT. C. 201 (1951).
37. INT. REv. CODE § 1800.
38. See State v. Cook, 108 Fla. 157, 146 So. 223 (1933).
39. Culbreath v. Reid, 65 So.2d 556 (Fla. 1953).
40. Id. at 557.
41. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 27989.
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LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The bevy of legislative enactments in 1953 covered a wide area. They
included certain credits allowed against premium receipts41; chain store
exemptions under prescribed circumistances 4 -2; revised the license tax
on retail stores 3; changed the inheritance and estate taxes44; changed the
the taxes on cigarette monies 45; provided that possession of a federal
wagering occupational tax stamp would be prima facie regarded as violation
of the state gambling laws 40; increased the tax on dog tracks47; provided
exemptions on certain described athletic contests8 ; modified the gross
receipts tax on public service corporations where the resale is made to
a municipality49 ; authorized the refunding of motor fuel taxes for fuels
used solely for agricultural and fishing purposes 0 ; modified the provisions
of the homestead exemption allowance and the penalties appertaining
thereto5 ; increased the excise tax on grapefruit52; enacted a provision
relating to an excise tax on wines53 ; enacted a provision relating to tax
exemptions on petroleum sales to the United States54; modified the
provisions on payments of the documentary stamp tax; enacted some
general changes relative to the cigarette tax collection and administration 6 ;
modified the provisions of the corporation capital stock tax57; modified the
occupational stamp tax exemption for deaf and dumb persons 8 ; changed
the provision for interest on delinquent taxes59; changed the collection
of intangible tax collectionsO; amended the provisions relative to hotels,
restaurants, etc."'; changed the filing tax provisions applicable to foreign
and domestic corporations6 2; changed the sales tax exemption provisions
for sales of livestock63; modified the tax exemptions on non-profit
corporations 4 ; and modified the provisions applicable to tax sale
certificates 5 .
42. Fla. Laws 1953 c. 28008.
43. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28028.
44. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28031.
45. Fla. Lews 1953, c. 28039.
46. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28057.
47. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28058.
48. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28082.
49. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28091.
50. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28098.
51. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28105 & 28199.
52. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28130.
53. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28177.
54. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28191.
55. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28216.
56. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28227.
57. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28248.
58. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28251.
59. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28254.
60. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28272 & 28302.
61. Fla. Laws 1953 c. 28276.
62. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28285.
63. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28297.
64. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28307.
65. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28316 & 28317.
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DISTANT VISTAS
State and local taxation are assuming an increasing importance. In
this age of high federal expenditures, one might understandably forget
that state and local expenditures have likewise increased. Therefore,
it is reasonable to assume that activity in the state and local tax level
will continue; and increasingly, thought will be given to periodical
examinations and revisions of entire features of the tax structures at
these levels.
